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Should the following scenario be considered imaginary? In 2040, the in-
ternational agreed target of maximum 20C climate warming-up was ex-
ceeded with one degree. A repeated severe drought made the rivers in Eu-
rope unnavigable, causing shortages of raw material supplies. This was fol-
lowed by severe autumn storms and flooding along the shores of the North 
Sea causing many casualties and damage to civilians and industry. The 
public indignation was pronounced: “Why have the authorities done noth-
ing?” Though the causal relation between natural disasters and CO2 was 
still not rock-solid proven, this chain of events and public fear of more 
catastrophes resulted in climate scepticism being met with open hostility. 
Consequently European policy makers were driven to radical action. CO2 
emission licences were reduced to a minimum and violations brought un-
der a severe a criminal law regime. Unlicensed emitting hot house gases 
was to be penalised as ‘causing severe physical harm’, at the same punish-
ment level as qualified assault. That is not all: once this penal clause was 
accepted, addition criminal legal constructions were applied, such as con-
spiracy or participation in a criminal organisation, if more than three man-
agers were involved. As the forbidden emission is assumed to make illegal 
gains which have to be disguised in the books, the offence of money laun-
dering was added to the criminal emission construction. As is normal in 
legislation, once a new construction is put into the legal system, it soon 
intertwines with many existing ones, creating a new constructed reality.  
                                                          




 This can also be considered as a warning: be cautious with fears. Still, 
such a fear-response criminal law scenario is quite common (Van Duyne, 
2004). In fact, it is a cast-iron formula in criminal policy making and law 
enforcement. Fear implies the perception of a threat that has to be fended 
off and in our ordered society, governed by the rule of law, a common 
reaction is to resort to criminal law constructions. Threat, risk, fear, or be-
lief in the ‘Terrible Snowman’, they can all be driving forces for legisla-
tion, apart from material and political interests of the law makers. If a sub-
stantial part of the population believes in the threat of the ‘Terrible Snow-
man’, it is real enough to feed law making. Naturally, the ‘Terrible Snow-
man’ fear is a bizarre rhetoric, but is that more bizarre than the criminali-
sation of homosexuality or blasphemy? Not long ago in the late 1960s that 
feeling of fear for homosexuality faded (but never fully) making the rele-
vant criminal law constructions obsolete or empty.2 Decriminalisation of 
homosexuality followed in most of the industrialised world – to the joy of 
the LGBTQ+ communities. But do not dare to be blasphemous and gay (or 
both) in most of the Muslim countries: that is tempting fate. 
 Given this importance of emotions in criminal law matters, we can 
speak of fear management: capturing and maintaining fear, which must be 
cast in a rational way into a legal mould: legislation and/or budget. Inter-
estingly, once fear is recognised (or fanned) politically, it is unlikely that 
it will be refuted when no real threat manifests itself. Galeotti (2018) 
summed up a number of Russian organised crime (OC) threats to the 
‘West’. But he had to admit that the Russians did not come in the sensa-
tional OC outfit or made strategic alliances with the mafias (Rawlinson, 
1998). Instead, they came as (criminal) traders which does not stir such 
high fears. So the fear of “crime from the East” as law enforcement prior-
ity, for which in the Netherlands even established a special team (Noord 
en Oost Nederland), sank into oblivion but the constructions around it lin-
gered on for a while.3 
                                                          
2  In Europe decriminalisation of homosexuality started in 1791, in France and 
Andorra. In England and Wales it was decriminalised in 1967, Scotland 1981 
and Northern Ireland 1982.  
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sexual_Offences_Act_1967 
3  Kernteam Noord en Oost Nederland, Algemene Criminaliteitsbeeldanalyse 
Oost Europa, 2000-2001. 
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 In the ‘fear-of’ a specific crime there can also be much ambiguity, 
which may be reflected in the law enforcement response. For example, the 
governments and employers in many EU industrial sectors realise that the 
steady retirement of the older workers must be replaced by migrants to 
keep production and the economy going. At the same time there is a fear 
of irregular migration. So, a smart law maker must respond to that dual 
challenge by moderate law enforcement (“doing something”) but not so 
much that the strawberries remain unharvested or the housing construction 
is delayed. Threat images may also be exploited to arouse resentments and 
then display the expected law enforcement firmness: “action is taken”. 
Even if refugees are successfully kept out of countries, such as in Poland 
and Hungary, the constructions to fend off the threat remain literally in the 
field. 
 With so many tasks to stem the tide of a multitude of threats and reduce 
fears, it is not surprising if governments also drop stitches or show ambi-
guity or (worse), duplicity, in law enforcement. For example, clamping 
down on corruption, illegal migration and labour exploitation are emotive 
election themes (feel good), but a strict policy may affect many vested in-
terests in countries with a tradition of mal-governance or in times of labour 
shortage. This stapling of legal constructions and ambiguous enforcement 
leads to legal uncertainty, particularly concerning aliens (Herkes, 2018). 
 
Aliens: problematised, criminalised and exploited 
 
The continuous movement of people is an historic given, whether as homo 
sapiens ‘out of Africa’ or as Goths during the Germanic migration 
(Heather, 2009). One tribe landed as Longobards in North Italy, and shaped 
the region by threatening the Pope Stefanus who in 754 had to call in the 
Frankish king Pepin the Short to protect him (Norwich, 2013), with fateful, 
long lasting consequences. Migrating people have rarely been welcomed, 
unless explicitly invited as ‘guest workers’. In that capacity they are not 
criminal. But nevertheless, “they steal our jobs”. Even if they do not steal 
or are otherwise not more criminal than the rest of the population, they are 
put into a criminal ‘frame’, in particular when their numbers are perceived 
as overwhelming. Then feelings of unsafety start to spread among the peo-
ple putting the (local) administration under pressure “to do something”. 
Usually this entails tough ‘crimmigration’ measures to assuage the people. 
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As Anna di Ronco and Anita Lavorgna set out in their chapter, such crim-
inal framing is media supported and rather ‘politically neutral’ in the sense 
that political left or right do not differ much in their attitude. The authors 
analysed the media in two North Italian cities, and did not find much dif-
ferences in the measures passed by both centre-right and centre-left coali-
tions. While the tune of the authorities’ rhetoric differs somewhat (more 
sensationalist on the side the Lega), they did not differ much in the appli-
cation of municipalities’ criminal and administrative tools. These are in-
tended to sanction an individual’s behaviour when it is deemed to affect 
the quality of life in the city centres. Protection against perceived criminal 
harm has turned into reducing ‘existential uneasiness’ caused by aliens ‘lit-
tering the public space’ and affecting the ‘decorum’. Was this criminal ap-
proach necessary? Instead of constructing this ‘decorum loss’ in a criminal 
frame, the authorities could also consider a non-criminal approach: hand-
ing out jackets, ties and other ‘decorum enhancing’ items to the migrants 
such that they would not be considered as unsightly and ‘littering’.  
 Of course, ‘littering the streets’ is not a real migrant’s choice. In prin-
ciple they want to make a living. In the end, if not repatriated, most do so 
legally. Not all irregular migrants succeed in achieving this desired out-
come. Trang Nguyen describes in her chapter the diversity in vicissitudes 
of Vietnam migrants arriving in Europe. That occurred in three waves and 
in which the Vietnamese migrants faced various employment ‘choices’, 
though as a rule there was not much to choose. Naturally this depends on 
the (underground) economic opportunities. In the UK many Vietnamese 
entered the home-grown cannabis industry (‘gardener teams’) and in Ger-
many they found an income in the Berlin illegal cigarette market (Nguyen 
and von Lampe, 2018). Often the previous wave of Vietnamese was al-
ready moving towards legal employment and leaving their market place to 
the newcomers. It testifies to the resilience and dynamism of the Vietnam-
ese enterprising spirit in the underground market. But this is not without 
hardship and many shattered hopes of earning enough to pay off the smug-
gling debt and send money home. This financial flow back to Vietnam is 
also advantageous the Vietnamese government, who willingly and know-
ingly furthers this migration, particularly from impoverished rural regions. 
Corruption and deceit are common in this migration business, which blurs 
the dividing line between state organised migration, and irregular migra-
tion with the accompanying smuggling and trafficking. 
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 This ambiguous situation is not unique. In a provocative chapter on 
transnational crime of Chinese origin in the EU Jurij Novak sheds light on 
the criminal landscape, in which migrants move to and fro, some smug-
gled, others trafficked, and some migrants operating as seemingly legal 
entrepreneurs, but fraudulently cutting edges to remain competitive with 
their local semi-legal branch. His chapter describes the highly confusing 
situation of the Chinese migrant workers in the Chinese garment industry 
in the city of Prato, Italy. First, the author does away with a lot of myths 
around Chinese Triads and Chinese migration of whatever modality. After 
tidying up these fanciful constructions, the author elaborates the organisa-
tion of crime in the textile and garment industry in Prato. Amidst a large 
Chinese minority of 30.000 to 40.0004, of which a substantial part remains 
illegal in the country, Chinese entrepreneurs have established a partly un-
derground garment industry. With an annual estimated profit of 2 billion 
Euros they serve any chic Italian brand (or forge them). To keep the pro-
duction costs low and the products competitive, all kinds of law breaking 
have been observed. By any legal qualification the labourers can be con-
sidered as exploited or in a state of modern slavery. Despite that, they have 
little victimisation awareness, industriously working in long shifts after 
which they return to their damp and crowded dormitories. Their main con-
cern is to transmit their savings home. Those who pull the strings lead com-
plex production organisations as ‘bourgeois’ crime entrepreneurs, dwarf-
ing old fashioned organised criminals. For the author these findings lead to 
the question: shouldn’t we investigate the more serious economic forms of 
organising crime? That is, not focus on the Chinese human smugglers, but 
on the wealthy underground entrepreneurs, with a respectful face but 
meanwhile exploiting his fellow countrymen. A rhetoric question. 
 State supported or enabled human smuggling of Vietnamese, the legal 
and illegal working relationships in the Prato Chinese textile industry, 
these findings provide strong indicators to look at migration and the related 
‘travel service’ from another, more anthropological angle as is done by 
Dina Siegel (2010) in her previous work as well as in her chapter devoted 
the refugee crises on the island of Lesbos, Greece. She juxtaposes the crude 
                                                          
4  All numbers in this volume will be in normal European notation: a comma for 
the decimals and a full stop for the thousands. 
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rhetoric of policy makers and policy documents to the findings of research-
ers doing field research at site. At the policy makers’ side we find the pre-
dictable construction of ‘ruthless’ networks exploiting the vulnerable po-
sition of defenceless refugees. If this rhetoric fails to impress it is rein-
forced by adding that the smuggling is the work of ‘organised crime’, al-
ways a good adjective to enhance the perception of threat. And indeed, 
there were organised crime groups operating and there are examples of 
reckless ‘services’: unseaworthy ships and unsafe life vests given to refu-
gees on overcrowded boats causing numerous casualties. On the other 
hand, providing ‘cross-border travel services’ is a purely consensual busi-
ness interaction in which the service provider rather heeds the principle: 
“Don’t drown your customers”. Obviously, doing so or being ‘cruel and 
rapacious’ will not further business. In contrast, the author’s fieldwork on 
Lesbos demonstrated that there were many decent ‘travel service provid-
ers’, though not necessarily good Samaritans: they have a business to run. 
There is also more surrounding business than the core business of illegal 
transportation. In fact, many inhabitants profited from the parallel eco-
nomic opportunities. For example, local transport and catering on the is-
land Lesbos which led to substantial price rises for the arriving migrants. 
This nuanced, ethnographically supported picture underlines the conclu-
sion of the author that clamping down on smugglers does not solve the 
problem of the flow of migrants: it is ritual dancing far removed from the 
daily struggle of people who want to leave harmful misery behind.  
 
Recognising and fending off harm and other mischief 
 
Fleeing misery at home is no guarantee against the fate of landing in other 
harmful situations in the targeted affluent economies where state and busi-
ness may enable other forms of exploitation. In cases in which this is un-
ethical there is no crime and one may argue that this goes beyond the nar-
row borders of criminology. But why? There is no reason to heed these 
criminal law limitations, according to Jonathan Davies, who looks through 
the ‘lens of harm’ beyond these narrow borders, namely at what happens 
on the workplace and in supply chain contexts in terms of harm. This is a 
valuable extension to a crime-restricted criminology. Indeed, many harm-
ful conditions on the work floor were legal for decades until they were 
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recognised as immoral and, after moral awareness raising actions, consid-
ered exploitative and harmful to physical and mental health. In the last re-
sort causing or maintaining such working conditions was criminalised. 
Nowadays such conditions are approached from the perspective of ‘mod-
ern slavery’. Developments in labour relationships and working condition 
should therefore be critically followed also by criminologists: there is an 
inherent tension between ‘sound’, meaning cost effective, working pro-
cesses, and costs saving negligence that may inflict harm to the workers’ 
health and rights. For example, making the corporation leaner and more 
flexible by dismissing personnel and hiring them back as self-employed 
enterprises under disadvantageous or harmful conditions: lower pay and no 
health or labour rights protection. In this way a new proletariat may 
emerge: ‘independent but exploited’. Nevertheless, at the moment not yet 
categorised as exploitation under a criminal law construction.  
 Recognising that harm may be inflicted remains inconsequential if not 
followed by securitisation: the cocktail of laws, local administrative and 
institutional measures to prevent harm and crime. Such a security or crime 
prevention cocktail tends to expand to all sides as is set out in the chapter 
by Anna Di Ronco and Anna Sergi and illustrated with the stiff safety re-
gimes in Italy and the UK. They point at how safety and crime prevention 
becomes dominant rather through a chain of associations, than through a 
chain of reasoned arguments. This may work as follows. First, there is nui-
sance, which is next associated with small crime, which is then connected 
to serious crime and that again to organised crime, eventually to its ‘trans-
national’ manifestation. In fact, ‘safety thinking’ is shaping a safety con-
struction that knows no boundaries. And what about the principles of pro-
portionality and subsidiarity? These words are repeated at all EU levels 
time and again, but then become subordinated to safety thinking in which 
these rational principles hardly play a role. The authors present Italy as a 
good example where getting a safe and ‘clean’ public space is a prime pri-
ority. Indeed, incivilities, hanging around on squares, making noise or 
making jibes at passers-by make people feel uncomfortable and unsafe in 
the public space. Correctly or not, a subsequent associative bridge to crime 
and irregular migrants is easily made. Basically people with a different ap-
pearance are considered ‘unwanted’ and subjected to administrative puni-
tive measures and bans to make the white middle class feel more comfort-
able. This security extension is not only an Italian xenophobia driven legal 
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construction. In the UK, by a court order one can be severely restricted in 
one’s freedom of movement or coming together in the public space if one 
is associated with a ‘gang’, a vaguely defined criminal law concept that 
leaves the police with a lot of latitude. In the case of drug involvement one 
is upgraded to ‘organised crime’. From the rule of law and the freedom of 
movement perspective, the EU should scrutinise these limiting legal con-
structions. However, that would be at odds with its own created European 
Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN). Will that institution disseminate 
best practices and at ther same time point at the mitigating requirement of 
proportionality? The authors express their doubt: in the politicised simpli-
fied construction of prevention and fear of crime there little room for this 
extra dimension. After all, one does not win elections by invoking propor-
tionality when taking advantage of voters’ fears is the winning card.  
 
More than mischief: organised crime and business goes on 
 
What about fear of organised crime? Would that not be an ultimate ‘win-
ning card’ in elections? Here we have a paradox: indeed, organised crime 
has for a long time figured on the top of the political priority pyramid 
(Lampe, 2016). From the late 1980s till the present, the threat image of OC 
functioned as an associative ‘crowbar’ argumentation as we saw in the pre-
vious chapter: in Italy as well as in the UK ‘organised crime’ was used to 
lend the proposed policies more weight: who can oppose a freedom re-
stricting crime prevention policy when the source of harm is allegedly ‘or-
ganised crime’ related. This implies that ‘organised crime’ remains in the 
general consciousness as a kind of keynote with a variable volume depend-
ing on the ‘tune’ of other political opportunities. Being a constant tune it is 
present for adding weight to a theme by adding the bridge-concept ‘nexus’. 
For example the “nexus of . . . organised crime”. Success guaranteed. 
Therefore, the way OC is constructed still deserves our critical attention 
(von Lampe, 2016). 
 With such multiple use one expects a lot of research activity and an 
accompanying availability of research funds. Is that the case? In their chap-
ter on research on organised crime in Germany Klaus von Lampe and Su-
sanne Knickmeier refute this expectation: compared to the political interest 
there is generally a shortage of basic empirical research, with the exception 
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of the Netherlands. The authors made a meticulous stock taking and anal-
ysis of the OC research landscape in Germany over a period of 2008-2017 
for which they collected research projects, dissertation projects and aca-
demic publications of German-based researchers on OC issues. This must 
be seen against the backdrop of the OC situation as presented in numerous 
police reports and media publications. Contrary to expectation, the type 
and subjects of research projects did not reflect the public OC image and 
concerns. In fact, measured by output the picture is fragmented. In general, 
there is a scarcity of empirical research compared to the large numbers of 
publicised studies, though in the beginning, around 1990, Germany had 
taken the lead in Europe. But after 2000, it seems to have lagged behind as 
is illustrated by the low output from 2008-2014, after which it started to 
catch up. Nevertheless, there remains a gap between the subjects of public 
attention in Germany and research interest. For example, the so-called Ar-
abic Clans, outlaw biker groups, and phenomena such as organised resi-
dential burglary. It remains to be seen whether recently launched studies 
into these thematic areas will lead to more than just sporadic research out-
put. One may wonder whether this lack of coherence is due to lack of a 
proper construction of the OC concept. And if such a construction cannot 
be drawn up, under the principle of scientific parsimony it should be dis-
carded. That is not done either: the OC flag remains on top, while the un-
derlying reality changes, as the next chapters on Scotland and the Czech 
Republic demonstrate. 
 Regarding the construction of OC in Scotland, Kenneth Murray raises 
the question concerning the working in network relations or in a hierarchy. 
Though in the criminological literature there is a tendency to interpret OC 
from the perspective of networks, for the Scottish organised crime land-
scape the author takes a middle position. Taking the wholesale cocaine 
traffic as the field of description, he constructs a hierarchic and a network 
interaction for the handling of the contraband. Unsurprisingly, the whole-
sale importation of contraband requires hierarchy: access abroad, oversight 
and scrutiny for the handling along the intermediate transport steps. These 
are distinctive capabilities that are inherent to a hierarchic organisation. 
Once the commodities have landed at retail distribution level, there is more 
need of flexible handling of the goods within network relations. However, 
for the reverse flow, the financial handling of the revenues, the criminal 
money management, higher expertise and oversight are required as special 
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operational abilities. For this task a hierarchically enforced financial disci-
pline is an essential asset also if financial tasks are out-coursed. Naturally, 
there may be network relationships between hierarchic organisations. At 
the end of the chapter we get a warning that the validity of the OC con-
struction may have only a geographic validity: it may mainly apply to the 
mid-Scotland central belt between Glasgow and Edinburgh. Up north the 
illicit market landscape appears to be more open. It is a warning to address 
the validity question seriously: what seems to be a valid construction can 
evaporate across territories and times. “Panta rhei”, all is changing, as Her-
acleitos would say. 
 This is almost literally the title of the chapter by Miroslav Scheinost: 
the changing face of organised crime, as it appears in his description of the 
past decades in the Czech Republic. The author leads us through the chang-
ing landscape of organised crime: from the ‘virgin’ years of the socialist 
society, where organised crime was not even thought of, to ‘socialist or-
ganised crime’, to the post-socialist transition epoch, till the present day 
where ‘organised crime’ has moved into higher circles. It could be consid-
ered the underlining of the statement that ‘organised crime always adapts’ 
itself to new circumstances and opportunities. Is that correct? If it is the 
same criminals who change their criminal enterprises and adopt new skills, 
the statement is correct. However, when changes bring other perpetrators 
to the criminal playground, ‘organised crime adapts’ is no valid proposi-
tion. One can only say that new opportunities requiring new skills also at-
tract another population of criminal entrepreneurs which subsequently 
changes the OC construction. Following the author’s account of the varia-
ble Czech OC scene closely, we notice indeed that he presents a different 
population than the ‘usual’ one: a sophisticated and institutionalised class 
of entrepreneurs having found a comfortable place in the warm chambers 
of the better circles (Scheinost, 2013). 
 We find a very usual organised crime population, described by Toine 
Spapens in his chapter on Italian criminals in the Netherlands. Why this 
interest? This has long roots, going back to the late 1980s and 1990s when 
with the rising fear of organised crime, alarms were also raised about the 
mafia ‘crossing the Alps’ northward to the Netherlands. More than at pre-
sent the official organised crime constructions were to a high degree fed 
by fear mongering, evoking emotions and threat images (Van Duyne, 
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2004). Nevertheless, it was not all fantasy: occasionally there were indica-
tions that members of the four Italian organised crime groups were in the 
country for other reasons than the Van Goch Museum: hiding for the Italian 
prosecution or planning new cocaine smuggling operations to Italy. To as-
sess whether the Italian criminal presence should be considered a threat, 
particularly subverting the democratic rule of law in the Netherlands, the 
Cerca Trova team (“search and thou shall find”) made an elaborate stock 
taking. And indeed, the team found indications of an Italian organised 
crime presence in the Netherlands: stretched over a time span of 25 years 
(1989-2014) there were 461 relevant observations mainly related to drugs 
trade (cocaine), and only 9 concerning extortion, in Italy the core business 
of OC groups. While some of the team jumped to an Italian OC presence 
with all the connected constructions, the author weighed the plausibility of 
long-term integrated Italian legal presence against the scarcity of typical 
OC (Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta, etc.) information. He thought that finding odd: 
mafia presence needs to be recognised and ‘respected’ in order to have 
power. But to become respected implies to be seen, which is bound to come 
to the notice of the police. This did not happen. So yes, there are OC related 
Italians in the Netherlands, but this does not support the proposition of a 
subversive ‘mafia threat’.  
 In the literature on organised crime and terrorism one can find many 
worrying constructions on the interconnectedness or ‘nexus’ of these two 
phenomena. This is assumed for terrorist financing, particularly regarding 
the acquisition of weapons. While sensational and speculative publications 
abound, empirical evidence is again scarce; at best anecdotal, such as in 
the Western Balkan during the 1990s (Prezelj, 2010). In a refreshing way, 
without allowing themselves to be burdened by speculative constructions 
Niels van Wanrooij and Saraï Sapulete undertook an inductive bottom-up 
investigation of the interconnectedness of organised crime and jihadi ter-
rorist networks in the Netherlands. To that end they used the Social Net-
work Analysis, and applied this to the ‘raw’ police data which had been 
filtered for ‘firearm possession’, ‘firearm dealing’ and (suspected) terror-
ism. From the resulting database of 40 persons relationships were mapped: 
five arm dealers, 15 suspected terrorists and 20 persons with a conviction 
related to fire arms. It was found that suspected terrorists had a one or two-
step connection to the firearms dealers, confirming the link between crim-
inal offenders and terrorism. But otherwise the findings did not reveal a 
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coherent terrorist network in the Netherlands. There were interactions be-
tween criminals and terrorist suspects, some of whom also had a criminal 
record before their conversion to jihadism, but the authors could not qual-
ify this finding as interconnectedness at a structural level. Though recent 
terrorist arrests demonstrate there are ‘terrorist cells’ in the country, the 
evidence is insufficient to justify an organised crime and terrorist nexus. 
Scientifically the chapter follows the rule of parsimony in deleting another 
speculative construction. 
 
Corruption and integrity   
 
Many criminal events occur as a fate, something sudden, not as a daily 
experience: the ‘daily fate’ is grammatically not wrong, but still sounds 
odd. But how should you construct a fateful reality which implies a daily 
criminal burden, mostly of a moderate nature but influencing your life nev-
ertheless? That is the case when corruption has grown into a way of daily 
life, whether you like it or not: it has become a daily cost of getting various 
things done, from waving a parking ticket to getting your doctor degree. 
Of course, if you can compensate these corruption expenses by levying 
corruption fees yourself, you can in the end of the month or year determine 
whether you have succeeded to remain at the ‘sunny’ side of the corruption 
break-even point. So you can be a corrupt winner or a loser. As is the case 
with the legal economy, also at the social-economic bottom the corruption 
balance is negative: corruption rarely favours the underprivileged. No sur-
prise that many people demonstrate an ambiguous attitude to corruption, 
as investigated by Anna Markovska, Alexey Serdyuk, Petrus C. van Duyne 
and Konstantin Bugaychuk. In their 2017 survey of citizens in Kharkiv, the 
second town of Ukraine, they found views, reflecting a similar ambiguity 
or even duplicity: condemning corruption goes side by side with condoning 
or even positive statements and confession of a willingness to offer bribes 
voluntary, without being solicited or extorted. (See for Bosnia, Datzer et 
al., 2008). Small wonder that at higher political level there is not much 
political will to fight corruption. In fact, the institutional progress that has 
been made after 2014, was achieved under tough pressure of the interna-
tional donors, threatening to withdraw funds if legislative and institutional 
reforms would not be implemented. It was a process of a drawn out foot-
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dragging as was the case with the new Anti-corruption Court, from the 
President downwards, obstructing and slowing down by every step.5 
 A large part of the public displays a clear resignation to the present cor-
rupt landscape furthered by the opaque public administration with its 
closed windows and doors. This was also a characteristic of the police 
forces: an opaque and inward directed military organisation (militsiya), 
also considered highly corrupt. But after the Maidan Revolution (in which 
the police role was seriously criticised), a new police reform was carried 
out. Its most visual element was the introduction of a separate branch, the 
Patrol Police. Socio-psychologically, the most important element was citi-
zen’s confidence: police performance is supposed to be reflected in and 
measured by the confidence the public has in its police force. Naturally it 
is important to learn how the police reflect on their own role in this reform: 
what do they experience of this public trust? This part has been investigated 
by Igor Sviatokum, Alexey Serdyuk and Petrus C. van Duyne as presented 
in their chapter on police reform. Based on the responses of 479 officers 
the authors observe that the results are modest: between 40 and 50% of the 
respondents saw little change, with the exception of the Patrol Officers 
who thought the reform went into the right direction. In addition to the 
public trust perception, the research also asked the officers to assess the 
police organisation as a “fair employer”. It appeared that the fairness scores 
for the employer were generally low, whether related to protection of of-
ficers in court, fair pay, care and support in sickness or otherwise officers 
in need of support. This is important for maintaining confidence and integ-
rity in a law enforcement agency: this is no construction but a real-life basic 
condition.  
 How important such a trust is or the lack thereof, is not only apparent 
by the recent history of Ukraine, but is also borne out by a study in neigh-
bouring country Moldova as described by Petrus C. van Duyne and Bren-
dan Quirke in their chapter. 
 There are many reasons to compare the two countries for similarities 
and differences. The most important is their Corruption Perception Index: 
                                                          
5  Anastasia Krasnosilska: http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1529358373. This is 
not unique to Ukraine: Van Duyne and Stocco (2012) observed a similar lack 
of ‘political will’, rather personal attitude of a corrupt elite in Serbia. 
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30 for Ukraine and 31 for Moldova: the absolute bottom for Europe. An-
other similarity is that also in this country virtually no anti-corruption law 
would have been enacted or measure implemented if not accompanied by 
international (financial) ‘arm twisting’. There is one interesting difference: 
in Ukraine there is still a plurality of oligarchs who more or less can bal-
ance each other (if they do not conspire) (Konończuk et al., 2017). Such a 
‘democracy of oligarchs’ is absent in Moldova: after a protracted political 
struggle the oligarch with the largest political and law enforcement clout, 
Plahotniuc, succeeded in getting his rival, Filat, indicted and convicted in 
2016 to nine years imprisonment for the ill-famous one billion dollar fraud 
and laundering.6 The principle accomplice in this scheme, Mr. Shor, was 
convicted to 7,5 years. Notwithstanding this conviction, Mr. Shor’s sen-
tence has thus far not been executed. He was allowed to remain at large, 
establish his own political party and succeeded in the February 2019 elec-
tion to get a seat in Parliament. It is one of the most recent examples of 
‘capturing the state’ by criminal oligarchs, in this case the only one left. By 
massive funding he ‘owns’ the Democratic Party, controls the majority of 
media outlets and influences legislation and judiciary nominations. Alto-
gether Moldova represents an almost classical example of a ‘captured 
state’. Are there no institutional guardians against corruption? Yes there 
are, such as the Anti-Corruption Prosecution Office, led by persons of 
questionable expertise, underfunded and burdened with small corruption 
cases that could also be delegated to a local prosecutor. These sub-modest 
efforts allow the government to state “We are on the right track”, without 
moving much forward. 
 
Policy and businesses in foggy constructions 
 
Money laundering is one of the criminal law constructions that has become 
perceived as an entity in its own right. It shares this status with the adjacent 
concept of ‘organised crime’ with which it also shares a high degree of lack 
                                                          
6  Though Filat denied any guilt, summer 2016, his son (22) arrived in the UK, 
and in a not too sophisticated laundering action paid £400.000 in rent upfront 
for a penthouse in Knightsbridge, spent £200.000 on a Bentley and received a 





of clarity. Both also haunt us since the late 1980s (Van Duyne et al., 2018). 
They are also classic examples of what impact a foggy concept can have 
on the apparatus of law enforcement. But money laundering encompasses 
an extra action circle: the whole financial industry and related non-finan-
cial sectors. This would not be so bad if clarity would have been served, 
which is not the case. This is one of the lessons the reader can learn from 
the chapter by Brigitte Slot and Linette de Swart about the attempt of the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to evaluate the outcome of its poli-
cies, per country. Methodologically this is as ambitious as doing the Dakar 
Rally with an old 2-CV without mileometre and compass. Indeed, as the 
authors make it clear: the car is bound to run into the sand, if it can start at 
all. Basic methodological principles are violated: no concept clarity or 
proper operationalisation, no problem delineation and no zero measure-
ment, to mention just four mortal methodological sins. This is not the 
whole story: we can observe a kind of real-life sociological experiment of 
collective make-belief: while before the start at Dakar the 2-CV stands al-
ready with its four wheels until its axes in the sand, all stakeholders around 
shout for joy that it is moving fantastically. A whole evaluation story is 
constructed: one after the other mutual evaluation report is stacked together 
with countries’ national risk assessment, but we still cannot determine any 
outcome regarding the effectiveness of all these exploits, as also observed 
by Ferwerda (2018). The authors observe that the FATF outcomes are “pre-
dominantly the result of international negotiations, rather than strict ana-
lytical thinking”, which is hidden behind the aplomb with which these are 
presented.  
 Another construction with undeniably clouding effects is elaborated in 
the final chapter of Matjaž Jager, Ciril Keršmanc and Katja Šugman 
Stubbs. It concerns ‘corporate social responsibility’, a construction of 
moral rules for the conduct of multi-national corporations. As such it has 
an inherent social acceptability, but, as the authors indicate in the title, it is 
rather used as a mask for various forms of corporal misconduct. Naturally 
there is a tension between the basic aims of the multinational: earning 
money and satisfying the shareholders on the one hand, and being morally 
accountable to the society on the other hand, if only by lip service to avoid 
criticism. But to what society? And where and who is the responsible legal 
person, when there is a mother company with daughters spread over mul-
tiple countries? All connected branches will have ethical codes of conduct 
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which will be presented as tokens of corporate social responsibility. How-
ever, what happens behind this slick PR behaviour? The authors provide 
examples from the oil industry that clearly contradicts the tenets of its own 
social responsibility, particularly when they operate in countries with a 
flawed, corrupt governance. The authors even apply the analogy of the hu-
man psychopathy to the attitude and conduct of the corporate persons: de-
ceptive, charming, rationally scouting for weaknesses, lack of sympathy 
for the victims, no remorse and, with an inflated ego, persistent in their 
claims of having done the best, pointing at philanthropic or ecological pro-
jects to ‘greenwash’ their corporate misbehaviour. Nevertheless, there is a 
silver lining. Like most constructions, once corporate social responsibility 
is consistently upheld by a large enough part of civil society, it will get a 
life of its own. That is good as it can be invoked to hold wrong-doers re-
sponsible, whether in court or in public.  
 So, although the world is shaped by constructions, some of them foggy 
mind projections, is does not mean that they cannot have a beneficial effect 
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